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BRADLEY BELT:'
Our discussion today is quite timely because top officials from the World Bank,
International Monetary Fund ("IMF") and the G-72 gathered, in Washington, this week to
discuss economic problems in Japan and Asia? Furthermore, finance ministers, central
bank governors, and economists will gather, later this year, to discuss the modernization
of the architecture of the international financial markets, as championed by Treasury
Secretary, Robert Rubin
What happened to the "Asian Miracle"? For the past thirty years, peace among
the Asian nations permitted their economies to enjoy remarkable economic growth and
prosperity. In 1996, there was a total of $93 billion in private capital inflows to
Indonesia, Thailand, South Korea, Malaysia, and the Philippines! During the last six
Vice President, International and Economic Policy, Center for Strategic and International Studies.
2 See G7: G-7 Preparing Leaders'Statement on Global Crisis, Administration Says, BNA INT'L. Bus.&
FIN. DAILY, Nov. 2, 1998, at D2 (explaining that the G-7 consists of the United States, Canada, the United
Kingdom, Germany, France, Japan, and Italy).
' See John W. Head, Lessons From the Asian Financial Crisis: The Role of the IMF and the United
States, 7-SPG KAN. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 70 (1998).
' See Robert Rubin, Rubin Stresses IMF's Central Stabilizing Role, Need to Update Global Financial
Structure, in IMF SURVEY, Jan. 26, 1998, at 23; see also Financial Reform: Clinton, Rubin Califor "New
Mechanism" to Bolster Economies Hit by Contagion, BNA INT'L BUS. & FIN. DAILY, Oct. 5, 1998, at D2
(explaining that Rubin's plan calls for the creation of a "new mechanism" to aid nations in weathering
liquidity problems caused by global contagion rather than implementing their own faulty policies).
I See Michael M. Phillips, Asian Crisis Could Sop Economic Gains: World Bank Says Hard Times Might
Affect Millions, WALL ST. J., Sept 30, 1998, at .A15 (stating that the net private capital outflow from the
five Asian countries will come to an estimated $24.6 billion this year, after a S6 billion outflow last year
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months of 1997, however, these markets saw an outflow of $12 billion.' This turnaround
of $105 billion in one year represented 11% of their pre-crisis Gross Domestic Product
("GDP") and about 15% to 20% of their post-crisis GDP.7
What accounted for this dramatic change? What can be done to prevent similar
financial crises in the future? What caused the Asian financial crisis ("Asian Crisis")?
There has been a great deal of finger pointing as to what precipitated the Asian Crisis.
Former Malaysian Prime Minister Mahathir bin Mohamad claimed that hedge funds and
speculators were the proximate cause of the Asian Crisis,' however, an IMF empirical
study concluded that hedge funds were not the cause of the Asian Crisis. This study
suggested that hedge funds actually make financial markets more stable.' The study
further indicated that most hedge funds followed the local markets and, as a result, the
hedge funds lost." Nonetheless, the hedge funds exacerbated the Asian Crisis because of
the pressures their speculators placed on the Asian markets.
and a $93.8 billion inflow in 1996).
& See The Perils of Global Capital: Asia's Financial Crash Showed the Fragilities of Global Capital
Markets. How Can They Be Made Safer, EcONOMIST, Apr. 11, 1998, at 52 [hereinafter Perils tf Global
Capital] (stating that the five worst-affected Asian economies saw an outflow of $12 billion).
See id. (stating that the shift of $105 billion in one year was the equivalent to 11% of their combined
GDP).
' See Asian Stocks Fall Sharply For a 2d Day, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 29, 1997, at D2 (stating Mahalhir's
belief that hedge-fund operators caused the turmoil in Malaysia's market to make profits for themselves
and their clients).
' See B. Eichengreen and D. Mathieson, Hedge Funds and Financial Market Dynamics, IMF
OCCASIONAL PAPERNO. 166 (1998); see also Stephen J. Brown, James Park and William N. Goetzmann,
Hedge Funds and the Crisis of 1997, NBER WORKING PAPER No. 6427 (1998) (finding that there has been
no indication that major hedge funds profited from the fall of Southeast Asia's currencies during the
summer or fall of 1997); A Hitchhiker's Guide to Hedge Funds: The Villains of Global Finance Deserve a
Better Reputation, ECONOMIsT, June 13, 1998, at 2 [hereinafter Hitchhiker's Guide to Hedge Funds]
(explaining how hedge funds are small players when compared with banks and mutual or pension funds
which engage in similar types of speculation).
'O See Hitchhiker's Guide to Hedge Funds, supra note 9 (reporting that forward sales of the Thai currency,
the baht, occurred after domestic firms and international banks had wagered that the baht would collapse).
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Some commentators and economists believe that changing economic policies in
the region caused the Asian Crisis. For example, Paul Krugman' asserted that the Asian
Crisis was the result of poor banking regulation. 2 Jeffrey Sachs 3 and Joseph Stiglitz 4
suggested that the crisis was linked to the private sector and under-regulated financial
decisions. 5 Although Paul Krugman, Jeffrey Sachs and Joseph Stiglitz disagree on the
actual cause of the Asian Crisis, they agree that the Asian Crisis was unforeseen and
would not have occurred had the Asian economies been sound.
Many commentators blamed the IMF as the source of the Asian Crisis. 6 They
stated that the IMF caused the Asian Crisis by encouraging Thailand to cease fluctuating
the baht against the U.S. dollar. 7 Thailand complied with this prescription, and the value
of the baht fell dramatically." Some believe that this devaluation of the baht triggered
the Asian crisis and led to a devastating chain reaction that caused a near depression. 9
" Paul R. Krugman is the Ford International Professor of Economies at Massachusetts Institute of
Technology.
" See Paul Krugman, Asia: What Went Wrong?, FORTUNE, Mar. 2, 1998, at 32; see also Paul Krugman,
What Happened to Asia?, Address Before an Economic Conference in Japan (Jan. 1998) (transcript
available at http:I/veb.mit.edu/krugman!wwwldisinter.html) (theorizing that the Asian crisis was brought
on by financial excess and then financial collapse).
" Jeffrey D. Sachs is director of the Harvard Institute for International Development and an economic
advisor to governments in Asia and other parts of the world.
"4 Joseph Stiglitz is the senior vice president and chief economist of the World Bank. See Joseph Stiglitz,
Bad Private-Sector Decisions, WALL ST. J., Feb. 4, 1998, at A22 (theorizing that misallocation of
investment, unhedged short-term borrowing, and very high debt-to-equity ratios made these economies
especially vulnerable to a sudden withdrawal of confidence).
'$ See id.; see also Jeffrey D. Sachs, The Wrong Medicine for Asia, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 3, 1997, at A23
[hereinafter Wrong Medicine].
6 See G. Pierre Goad, Thai Economy to Feel Pain, But How Long?, ASIAN WALL ST. J., July 7, 1997, at1.
17 See id
" See The Economy: Will Devaluation's in China, Japan Spark New Crisis?, lNv. Bus. DAILY, May 27,
1998, at A6.
9 See Jeffrey D. Sachs, International Monetary Failure? The IMF's Prescriptions Might Actually Make
Asia's Financial Turmoil Worse, TIME INT'L, Dec. 8, 1997, at 20 (explaining how the panic in Thailand
spread to its neighbors even though there was nothing fundamentally wrong with them); see also William
Pesek Jr., Dis-Oriented Markets: A Year Into the Asian Crisis. No Light At the End of the Tunnel,
BARRONS, July 27, 1998, at 17 (stating that when Thailand effectively devalued the Baht over a year ago,
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Of particular concern is that the IMF, the institution responsible for ensuring the
stability of the monetary system, prescribed harsh "medicine" that contributed to this
economic crisis." By requiring stringent austerity measures, the IMF failed to take into
consideration what measures were actually needed to stimulate growth within the Asian
region. Equally disturbing is the fact that IMF economists have candidly admitted that
they did not know how or why the contagion spread.2' These statements call into
question the efficacy and merit of the IMF's monetary policies and prescriptions.2
For now, the Asian Crisis has stabilized?3 Notwithstanding the uncertainty
surrounding the Indonesian economy, currencies 'and stock markets have rebounded from
their earlier loWS, 24 and bargain hunters are sifting through the wreckage. -  Growth,
the currencies of its neighbors have tumbled in a devastating chain reaction that has produced a near
depression).
20 See Wrong Medicine, supra note 15. Jeffrey Sachs, in addition to other economists, has advanced the
theory that the IMF's medicine failed because the Asian Crisis had a very different set of problems than the
IMF typically has to solve. .Id The work-of the IMF has generally been to rescue, monetarily,
governments living beyond its means. Id. In this type of scenario, a prescription that calls for a cut in the
budget and restriction on central bank credits to the government cuts inflation and halts weakening of the
currency and loss of foreign exchange reserves. Id The Asian Crisis, however, had a very different set of
problems that could not be solved from this type of prescription. Id See also Asian Business: the Crisis,
BUsINESs WEEK, July 13, 1998; at 20.
2 See M.L. Burstein and Alan Reynolds, Devaluations Don't Bring Prosperity, WALL ST. J. EUR., Sept. 1,
1997, at 6 (stating that the IMF should understand what happened in the crisis and should have been
prepared to support measures to make Asian currencies immune to assault).
' See Wrong Medicine, supra note 15. Jeffrey Sachs theorizes that Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines
and Thailand had running budget surpluses, not deficits. Id. In addition, inflation had been low and
federal reserves had not been falling. Id The IMF should have let the Asian currencies float downwards,
resulting in those countries exports being cheaper and therefore more competitive. Id. It should further
moderate the strong forces pushing Asia into a recession, rather than adding to them. Id
' See Effects of Southeast Asian Crisis Revisited, REAL EST. FIN. TODAY, Feb. 20, 1998, at 10 [hereinafter
Asian Crisis Revisited] (stating that the situation in the Pacific Rim may have stabilized with the
introduction of new measures by Asian countries to stimulate their domestic economies, namely lowering
interest rates); but see Paul Krugman and Jeremy Kahn, Saving Asia: It's Time to Get Radical The IMF
Plan Not Only Has Failed to Revive Asia's Troubled Economies But Has Worsened the Situation It's Now
Time For Some Painful Medicine, FORTUNE, Sept. 7, 1998, at 74 (reporting that while Asia's "currencies
have stopped plunging for a moment, its real economies are getting weaker, not stronger).
24 See Asian Crisis Revisited, supra note 23 (reporting that currencies have rebounded and stock prices
have appreciated from their current lows).
25 See Jathon Sapsford, Now Japanese Are Up in Arms About U.S. Investment in Distressed Properties,
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however, will be slower throughout 1998 and into early 1999. Therefore, one can expect
significant deflation in the region.
The question now is whether China and Japan will become the engines for
economic growth in the region. Thus far, Japan has done very little to signal to the rest of
the world that it is willing to stimulate domestic demand and assume this role.2" China,
on the other hand, has enhanced its commitment not to devalue the yuan, but it too has
deep-rooted structural weaknesses in its economy and therefore, can not serve as the
engine in the region.
What, if anything, can be done to lessen the likelihood of a recurrence? How can
the world lessen the severity and magnitude of such problems?
Generally, reform recommendations are in three different areas.2 First, there is a
need to foster greater transparency and enhance information flows.2" Second, there is a
WALL ST. J., May 19, 1998, at Al (reporting that investnent in Japanese property by U.S. funds has
increased more than five-fold in a year).
26 See David Wessel, Just a Little Seminar on Odd Things in Asia, WALL ST. J., July 13, 1998, at Al
(noting that Japan's recession is home-grown and can be cured only at home).
27 See Rubin, supra note 4 (discussing the four objectives Rubin recommends to identify possible
mechanisms.and challenges to the international system, including: "improving transparency and disclosure;
strengthening the role of the international financial institutions in helping to continue to deal with the
challenges of today's global markets; developing the role of the private sector in bearing an appropriate
share of burden in times of crisis; and strengthening the regulation of the financial in emerging markets");
see also Allassane D. Ouattara, "Why Have the Asian Dragons Caught Fire? ", Address at the Royal
Academy of Morocco Seminar (May 4, 1998) (transcript available at
<http:www.imf.orglextemallnpfspeechesl19981050498A.HTML>) (citing additional elements that are vital
for economic growth and financial stability).
28 See Ouattara, supra note 27 (explaining how a lack of transparency about the extent of liabilities of a
government's central banks, the underlying health of the financial sector, the structure of indebtedness in
the private sector, and links between industry, banks and government and their possible impact on
economic policy, allows markets to fear the worst); see also Perils of Global Capital, supra note 6 (citing
such examples of Thailand's secret sales of foreign reserves making a mockery of its reserve levels and no
one knowing how large South Korea's short-term debt was as reasoning for why global markets would
work better if there were more information available
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need to regulate the financial sector of the affected markets, as well as all emerging
markets. 29 Third, there is a problem of moral hazard.3"
World leaders, economists and commentators are mandating reform of the global
monetary system. For example, Treasury Secretary Robert Rubin has unveiled
architecture for a new international financial market.31 Japan's Vice Finance Minister has
called for a new Bretton Woods system.32 George Soros has proposed the creation of an
international credit insurance corporation to ensure global liquidity.33 This organization
would play a similar role to that played by the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation and
the Federal Savings and Loan Insurance Corporation.34 Henry Kaufnann, an American
markets watcher, has proposed the creation of a new international financial regulator that
would monitor participants in global capital markets.35 This institution would set
minimum capital standards and establish uniform trading, reporting, and disclosure
- See Ian Johnson and Kathy Chen, China Unveils Bold Steps to Reform Economy - Ambitious
Recapitalization is Set for State Banks, Bureaucracy is to be Cut, WALL ST. J., Mar. 2, 1998, at A I5
(stating that China's sweeping reforms include state run enterprises and financial systems).
" See Bob Davis, Rubin Urges Foreign Bank Crackdown - Call is for Financial Powers to Press
Emerging State to Beef up Regulations, WALL ST. J., Apr. 15, 1998, at A2 (noting that economists use the
term "moral hazard" to describe a situation where a lender of last resort steps in and saves institutions that
have made imprudent lending decisions); see also Eric Altbach, The Asian Crisis and the IMIF: After the
Deluge, The Debate, JEI REP., May 1, 1998, available in 1998 WL 9332251 (theorizing that IMF bailouts
encourage lender irresponsibility and inevitably perpetuate financial crisis because lenders act knowing that
any losses they incur will be absorbed by the IMF).
"' See Rubin, supra note 4 (explaining how Rubin's plan focus' on four key elements, including:
"supporting reform programs in individual nations; providing temporary financial assistance when needed;
encouraging strong action by Japan and the other major economic powers to promote global growth; and
fostering policies in other developing and emerging economies to reduce the risk of contagion").
" See Asia Looks for Answers, WALL ST. J., Mar. 6, 1998, at A14 (stating that it was at Bretton Woods,
the New Hampshire resort, where financial officials from more than 40 countries agreed in 1944 to link
currencies at fixed exchange rates in order to provide stability and growth to the post-war era).
3 See TCA Srinivasa-Raghavan, Bubbling Over With Old Ideas, BUS. STANDARD, Jan. 12, 1998, at 11.
See id. (noting that the company George Soros aims to create would administer bailouts for countries in
payments crises).
" See Perils of Global Capital, supra note 6.
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requirements.36 Jeff Sachs, an advocate of this recommendation has called for an
international bankruptcy policy structure, which would be modeled after the U.S.
framework. These ideas and many others will be considered and more details will be
offered in the months ahead.
MALCOLM BINKS:3
While we could discuss the causes of the Asian crisis at length, I would prefer
instead to focus on the current status of the crisis and what is being done to resolve the
problem.
The world discovered Asia in the 1990s as foreign investors recognized the
region's potential for growth. 8 As a result, the influx of capital from foreign investors
and lenders led to strong economic growth and great progress for the region throughout
the decade. 9 In 1997, however, the euphoric bubble that had embraced Asia finally burst.
The most alarming aspects of the crisis that followed were its devastating effects
on currency and stock markets in the immediately affected areas and its rapid contagion
effect on neighboring countries' economies."0 As a result of the varied development of
economies in the area, the contagion effect's impact differed from country to country.
Consequently, the crisis' effects and the appropriate reform measures for its resolution are
36 See id.
" Managing Director and Senior Vice President, Merrill Lynch International.
3 See Stanley Fischer, The Asian Crisis: A Viewfrom the IMF ? Address at the Midwinter Conference of
Bankers'Associationfar Foreign Trade (Jan. 22, 1998) (transcript available at http://www.imf.org/extemal
Inpfspeeches/19981012298.html) (reporting that the annual growth in GDP in the ASEAN.5, consisting of
Malaysia, the Philippines, Singapore, and Thailand, averaged close to eight percent over the past decade).
Stanley Fischer is the First Deputy Managing Director of the IMF. Id.
" See Jim Rohwer, Asia's Meltdown: It Ain't Over Yet, FORTUNE, July 20, 1998, at 92 (citing OECD
figures to show that as of mid-1997, Japanese banks' loans to Asia constituted 110% of the Japanese
banking system's capital as well as noting comparable figures for Europe).
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not uniform throughout the Asian economies, but rather differ depending upon the
countries' level of economic development. These levels of economic development may
be categorized into three classes: developed countries, newly-industrialized countries
("NICs") and developing countries. Before drawing any conclusions as to why the Asian
crisis transpired and how it should be remedied, it is necessary to analyze the affected
countries in light of these classes.
Japan is the only Asian country that may be characterized as a developed country,
having a mature, industrialized economy that is the second largest in the world. After
forty years of extraordinary growth, the Japanese economy growth rate slowed in the
1990s.4' Nonetheless, as the yen grew strong and Japanese workers became more
expensive, Japan entered an era where it needed a flexible, service-oriented, and
entrepreneurial economy. In the midst of seven years of economic stagnation and a
rapidly aging population, Japan is still trying to adjust to fulfill these economic needs.42
As a result, a fundamental issue for Japan is domestic confidence." While the
Japanese public does not feel a sense of crisis, they are worrying about their jobs and the
implications of old age." These are problems that do not have easy solutions.
40 See On the Edge: The Risks of a Deep Global Recession Are Increasing, ECONOMIST. Sept. 5, 1998, at
19 (describing the crisis as "the bubble bursts" and noting that the most disturbing aspect of the crisis has
been its effect on Wall Street and other developed markets).
41 See Robert Isaak, Making "Economic Miracles": Explaining Extraordinary National Economic
Achievement, AM. ECONOMIST, Apr. 1, 1997, at 59 (noting that Japan had a multiwave performance of
annual GDP growth beginning in the 1950's and averaging 9.4% for the next 22 years).
'2 See Gillian Tett, The Economy, FIN. TIMES, July 14, 1998, at 2 (stating that Japan's population is aging
sharply and their manufacturing sectors are losing competitiveness compared to other Asian rivals).
" See Nicholas D. Kristof, Shops Closing. Japan Still Asks. 'What Crisis?% N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 21, 1998, at
Al.
' See id. (explaining how a lack of crisis mentality in Japan means that there is little public pressure to
push for the deregulation necessary to revive the economy); see also See Gillian Tett, The Economy, FIN.
TIMES, July 14, 1998, at 2 (noting Japan's rapidly aging population and loss of industrial
competitiveness).
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There is a fear that Japan's inability to get its economy into a growth mode could
potentially start another crisis." As the second largest economy in the world and the
largest trading partner for many Asian countries, an economic recession in Japan would
certainly affect our global economy. While the Japanese government's proposed
measures might be sufficient to maintain a secure economy, Japan remains the most
troublesome country in terms of our global economy.
Taiwan, Hong Kong, and Singapore are currently characterized as NICs, although
their economies are approaching the status of developed countries. As a result of this
transition, solutions that may have worked for these economies in the past may now be
obsolete.4"
These nations were in relatively good shape at the onset of the crisis. Though not
immune from the fallout, their economies are still fundamentally strong.4" Even if these
economies experience slower growth this year, there appears to be little need for concern
in the near future.
The remaining Asian countries comprise the developing countries class. While
Malaysia and Thailand have made the most economic progress out of these countries, the
Philippines, Indonesia and China still have a lot of room for improvement.
Malaysia was not as severely impacted as many of its Asian neighbors.
Interestingly, it did not implement the IMF's policy prescriptions and is already showing
4s See Finance and Economics: Asia Trembles Again, EcONOMIST, June 20, 1998, at 81 (stating that the
fallen yen, together with the worsening economic data and political worries, has helped flatten the rallies
that lifted most of Asia's battered stock markets).
6 See id, (explaining how a weak yen affects competition and demand between the Asian countries and
reduces the availability of credit from Japanese banks to Asian borrowers).
" See Eric Altbach, The Asian Monetary Fund Proposal: A Case Study of Japanese Regional Leadership,
JEL REP., Dec. 19, 1997, available in 1997 WL 9040568.
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signs of recovery. 9 The Philippines also fared better than many of its neighbors. An
upcoming election, however, will determine which economic policies the Philippines will
choose to implement.
China's insulated economy was largely unscathed by the crisis." China can be
distinguished from other Asian countries because Chinese officials have publicly
recognized that their problems lie with the Chinese banking system and state-owned
enterprises. They appear to be trying their best to alleviate the problems.
Indonesia, on the other hand, may be in for a long period of economic difficulty.
Indonesia is currently in the final stages of a dominating regime that is unwilling to
reform its economy. As it is not clear when the Suharto regime will end, Indonesia may
experience more difficulties in the near future."
In reviewing these countries, it is interesting to see the effect of IMF intervention
in the crisis. Of the countries worst hit by the crisis, Thailand 2 and Korea 3 have
4 See Ouattara, supra note 27.
4 However, newly announced Malaysian Government policies with respect to capital controls will make
recovery more difficult. See also Mark L. Clifford, Can Mahathir Go His Way? So Far, He Is Avoiding
Reforms- and the Economy Shows It, Bus. WK., Mar. 30, 1998, at 50 ( noting that the evidence of
corporate distress increases daily in Malaysia).
'0 See Elaine Kurtenbach. Asia's Crisis Both Good and Bad For Unscathed China, SEATrLE Posr-
INTELLIGENcER, Feb. 23, 1998, at A2 (stating that China is the one major Asian country not involved in the
crisis thanks to its relatively insulated economy).
"' On May 21, 1998, Indonesian President Suharto resigned and was replaced by the Indonesian Vice
President Bucharuddin Jusuf Habibie.
"2 See Personal View: JeffSachs, FIN. TIMES, July 30, 1997, at I (theorizing that Thailand's crisis may be
attributed to overvaluation of the real exchange rate, coupled with booming bank lending that was heavily
directed at real estate).
" See John Burton, S. Korea Agrees to IMF Terms for Loan, FIN. TIMES (Seoul), Dec. 1, 1997, at I
(noting that the IMF bailout in Korea called for a slowdown in economic growth, an increase in interest
rates, a radical corporate restructuring, an increase in the employment rate, and a shake in the country's
troubled financial industry).
FORDHAM FINANCE, SECURITIES & TAX LA W FORUM
responded best to the IMF's "medicine." 54 While Thailand and Korea knew that such
remedies were necessary before the onset of the Asian crisis, there was a lack of political
desire to take the "medicine" until IMF intervention forced the issue. In the aftermath of
the move, both countries will experience negative growth, high inflation and rising
unemployment. Nonetheless, Thailand and Korea have implemented the proper policy
prescriptions and experienced positive results."S
While optimism that the crisis may have passed is warranted, we must avoid
generalizations when determining whether the crisis is over or whether the Asian
contagion will return stronger than ever. After a crisis of this magnitude, there is a
tendency for economists and economies to produce new ideas, systems and schemes to
solve the underlying problem. It must be recognized, however, that Asia is a collection of
unique countries with unique problems. Consequently, economists do not need to
reinvent the global economy in light of minute differences or fluctuations.
In the short term, the situation has stabilized. The financial markets and
currencies have recovered from their lows late last year and it appears that the panic has
passed. Meanwhile, the Asian slowdown has assisted the United States, the United
Kingdom and other industrial countries in fending off inflationary pressures. Hopefully,
with two-thirds of the global economy moving forward, Asia will recover.
' See id., at I (noting that the IMF bailout called for a slowdown in South Korea's economic growth rate
below 3%, an increase in interest rates of 18% to 20%, a radical corporate restructuring, an increase in the
employment rate possibly up to 6% as well as a shake out in the country's troubled financial industry).
SS See Ouattara, supra note 27 (theorizing that without the IMF's programs and the international support
behind Korea and Thailand, "the slowdown in these economies would be much more dramatic, the costs
for the general population much higher, and the risks to the international economy much greater").
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DR. DOMINICK SALVATORE:56
The Asian Crisis is the most serious financial crisis to occur since the
international debt crisis of the early 1980s. While the savings and loan crisis of the 1980s
cost the United States 3% of its GDP,57 the Asian Crisis is five times larger, at
approximately 10% to 15% of Asia's GDP."5 In addition, the Asian Crisis is more serious
than the Mexican crisis because no one saw the Asian Crisis coming or the extent to
which it would spread.
In hindsight, it is easy to identify the problems leading up to the Asian Crisis. In
the spring of 1997, I wrote an article comparing the Asian economic conditions to those
of Mexico in 1994."9 The analysis compared economic and financial data from different
countries and strongly suggested the presence of serious problems in Asia. While no one
could tell exactly when a serious crisis might occur, one could tell that it would take little
to trigger one. Naturally, we are not as interested in the past as we are in the future. If
the indices that I will present today have any validity, they should prove useful in
anticipating future crises.
For example, consider whether the current situation in Latin America is
approaching Mexico's economic situation in 1994. Although some of the indices would
S6 Distinguished Professor of Economics and Department Chair, Fordham University. He was President
of the International Trade and Finance Association; Chairman of the Economics Section of the New York
Academy of Sciences; and serves as a consultant to the United Nations and to the Economic Policy
Institute in Washington.
7 See Kimberly Blanton, Japanese Yen Continues Fall Against Dollar, BOSTON GLOBE, June 26, 1998, at
Cl (comparing Japan's proposed bailout costs, which are 8% of Japan's GDP, with U.S. savings and loan
crisis costs, which were 3% of the U.S. GDP).
58 See Financing the IMF Hearing Before Joint Econ. Comm., 105"' Cong. (Feb. 24, 1998) (transcript
available at 1998 WL 80548) (reporting testimony of Charles W. Calomiris, Professor of Finance and
Economics Columbia Business School, and Director of American Enterprise Institute Project on Financial
Deregulation, noting that Asian crisis losses are in the range of 15-25% of the affected countries' GDP's).
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indicate that this is indeed the case, the underlying conditions are so different that a crisis
may not be in the making at present.
Today, I would like to present some of Mexico's macroeconomic financial indices
for 1994, which were analyzed in my 1997 article.' I will then compare the Mexican
indices with indices for the Asian nations currently in crisis, as well as with those Asian
economies that have not been strongly affected by the crisis. The comparison should
prove that indices from the latter countries were substantially different from the former.
In table 1, we see some of the economic and financial indices that I have studied.
From this information, we can compare Mexico's values in 1994 with those of the Asian
economies immediately preceding the crisis.
Table I
Macroeconomics and Financial Indicators for Mexico in 1994 and East Asian Emerging
Markets with Weak Fundamentals in 1996 (percentages)
Mexico Korea Thai- Malaysia Indonesia Philip- India China
1994 land pines
S/GDP 18 33 33 37 29 20 25 43
BB/GDP -0.7 -0.1 3.0 0.9 1.2 0.0 -5.3 -0.9
CA/GDP -7.3 -4.8 -7.9 -4.9 -3.3 -4.7 -1.3 0.9
15.3a
EDT/GD 34.3 32.1b 50.3 42.1 59.7 47.3 25.6 16.0
P
4.9a
EDS/GD 9.3 10.3b 20.8 11.7 14.9 9.1 1.9 3.2
P
(CA- -4.6 -5.2 -6.8 -4.0 -1.4 -0.6 -0.4 5.9
" See Dominick Salvatore, Capital Flows, Current Account Deficits, And Financial Crises In Emerging
Market Economies, INT'L TRADE J., Spring 1998, at 5-22.
60 See id
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Legend:
S = Domestic
Savings
CA = Current
Account
RES = International
Reserves
GDP = Gross Domestic
Product
EDT = Total External
Debt
FDI = Foreign Direct
Investments
BB = Budget Balance
(deficit (-) and
surplus (+))
EDS = Short-Term External
Debt
DS = Debt Service Payments
X = Exports of Goods and Services of the Nation in the Year
M = Imports of Goods and Services (average monthly value);
a = originally reported; b = actual
First, consider the rate of savings (S/GDP). In 1994, Mexico's rate of savings was
18%. This is fairly low for a developing country. Mexico should have maintained at
least a 25% savings rate in order to employ the new workers that enter its labor market
each year. Although Mexico could have used capital inflow to obtain the same results,
that choice may have resulted in financial difficulties in the short run."
Next, observe the budget balance as a percentage of GDP (BB/GDP). In 1994, it
was -0.7% in Mexico. This was not a serious problem because a budget balance deficit
6 See Anil Padmanabhan, I Think Interest Rates Can Fall Further, Bus. STANDARD, Oct. 3, 1997, at 10
(quoting C. Rangarajan, Governor, Reserve Bank of India, discussing how absorbing capital inflows can be
problematic in weak domestic financial systems); See also Brian Reading, Why the IMF Has Got it Wrong:
Blame the West for Korea's Crisis, Argues Brian Reading, FIN. TIMES (LONDON), Dec. 20, 1997, at 2
(noting that unneeded capital inflows were a partial cause of the crisis in South Korea); Monetary
Instability in Asia: Hearing Before the Joint Econ. Comm., 104"' Cong.(Nov. 13, 1997) (transcript available
at 1997 WL 799715) (reporting testimony of Robert D. Hormats, Vice Chairman, Goldman Sachs
(international), noting that East Asian domestic financial systems were unable to effectively absorb the
large foreign capital inflows and domestic savings the economic systems were generating).
FDI)
/GDP
DS/X 28.1 7.0 11.5 8.2 36.8 13.7 24.1 8.7
RES/M 0.7 1.1 5.1 3.3 5.5 2.3 5.1 7.7
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did not cause the Mexican crisis.62 Although the balance was negative, any deficit below
1% of the GDP is not a major problem.
Next, we move to the ratio of the current account deficit with respect to GDP
(CA/GDP), which is very large. While there is no specific reason why this index
necessarily indicates a problem, economists know that anything above 4% to 5% in the
current account trade deficit, plus earnings from investments, is evidence of a problem in
the making. In 1994, Mexico's current account trade deficit was -7.3%.
Mexico's short-term debt6 (EDS/GDP) was 9% of GDP. This is a small figure,
but even 10% may present a problem because this type of capital can move in and out of
an economy very quickly."
Next, consider the current account less foreign direct investments ((CA-
FDI)IGDP). This represents the portion of the current account deficit financed by stable
long-term investments, as opposed to the amount financed with predominantly short-term
capital. A negative number above 3% to 4% in this index indicates the possibility of a
financial crisis. Mexico's current account less foreign direct investments represented
-4.6% of GDP in 1994.
The next index represents debt service as a percentage of exports (DS/X). Any
increase in the amount of export eamings funneled toward debt service makes it difficult
62 See A.J. Goulding, Retreating From the Commanding Heights: Privatizalion in an Indian Context, 50 J.
INT'L AFF. 581 (1997) (noting that Mexico's currency crisis resulted from a current account deficit, not a
budget deficit).
63 The term short term means six months or less.
" See David L. Roberts, Ph.D., Short-term Debt and the Asian crisis: What Did We Know and When Did
We Know I1?, EMERGING MARKETS DEBT REP., Apr. 27, 1998, at I (noting that the rapid build-up of short-
term debt in the Asian countries was a hidden factor leading to the Asian crisis); Conrad Raj, Singapore
Unlikely to Go Into Recession Soon: S&P Local Banks Among the Few in Asia with Investment Grade,
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for a country to address other financial obligations. This value was 28.1% for Mexico in
1994.
Finally, we come to the reserves to imports index (RES/M), which represents the
number of months of imports that can be financed through reserves. Mexico's value was
less than 1% in 1994. If we turn to look at Korea, Thailand, Malaysia, Indonesia, and the
Philippines, the five countries that recently suffered serious crises, one sees that their
figures are similar to Mexico's in 1994.
India and China are in a different class or category, because their controlled
financial markets sheltered them from some of the Asian Crisis' effects.65 I have included
their figures solely for the sake of comparison. In addition, we will consider figures for
Hong Kong, Singapore, and Taiwan that were undoubtedly affected when the market
tried to attack the Hong Kong dollar.66 Hong Kong, Singapore and Taiwan are also in a
different category.
Let us return to table 1 for a moment and see what has happened in these
countries. Looking at savings as a percentage of GDP, Korea, Thailand, Malaysia, and
Indonesia saved at a much higher rate of GDP than Mexico did in 1994. This is
characteristic of these countries' reputations for having high savings rates.
67
Bus. TIMES (Sing.), May 28, 1998, at 2 (quoting Cecile Saavedra, Director, S&P Singapore, blaming the
regional crisis on rapid build up of short-term debt, among other things).
65 See Hardev Kaur, Asian Crisis: Need for Financial Sector Review, BUS. TIMES, Apr. 20, 1998, at 4
(noting that countries with largely closed economies, such as China, India, and Taiwan, have not been as
dramatically affected by the Asian crisis, as those of more open economies, such as Thailand. Indonesia,
and Malaysia).
' See Thomas Crampton, Major Bankruptcy in Hong Kong Asian Markets Hard Dow Rebounds After a
Shock, INT'L. HERALD TRiB., Jan. 13, 1998, at I (examining the rise in Hong Kong lending rates in
response to speculative attacks on the Hong Kong dollar); see generally Hong Kong in Tumult, FIN. i'0ST,
Sept. 2, 1997, at 17 (noting analysts' concern with the effect of the Asian crisis on the Hong Kong dollar).
67 See Finance and Economies: The Vice of Thrift, ECONOMIST, Mar. 21, 1998, at 85 (noting that South
Korea, Malaysia and Thailand all invested approximately two-fifth of their GDP in 1996 and that high
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Consequently, when contrasted with the situation in Mexico, inadequate savings were not
a problem in these countries.
Similarly, these countries did not have budget balancing problems. Budget
deficits did not cause the crises in Mexico or Asia.6 In fact, out of these countries, only
Korea had a small deficit. Thailand, Malaysia, and Indonesia all maintained surpluses
and the Philippines had a balanced budget. India had a large deficit, but as I stated
earlier, India and China are in a different category.
Warning bells should ring when current account deficits reach a level of 4% to
5%. In 1994, Mexico's current account deficit was 7.3%. In 1996, Thailand had a
serious current account deficit, at 7.9%. Malaysia was at 4.9%, Korea was at 4.8%, and
the Philippines was at 4.7%. All of these current account deficits, like Mexico's 1994
current account deficit, were above the warning threshold.
Next, let us observe total debt as a percentage of GDP. At one time, it was
thought that Korea's total debt was approximately 15% of GDP. It officially estimated its
foreign debt at $45 billion.69 Korea's actual total debt grew larger. First, it grew to $65
billion and then it rose to $104.5 billion last year." According to the figures the Korean
government gave, the total debt of $45 billion would have been 15.3% of GDP. Because
savings rates have always been considered the pillars of East Asian growth); See World Bank: Global
Development Finance 1998 Report (stating that East Asia had a high savings rate from 1993-1996,
averaging over 30% of GDP in Indonesia, Korea, Malaysia and Thailand).
"' See Pam Woodall, Survey: East Asian Economies: On the Rocks, EcONOMIST, Mar. 17, 1998, at S5
(arguing that the Asian crisis was not caused by budget deficits, hut rather by pegged exchange rates and
imprudent reliance on short-term foreign capital).
9 See Recovery in South Korea Fuels Growth in Output, Trade Deftit, ASIAN WALL ST. J., June 2, 1994,
at 3 (noting the South Korean Central Bank's $45.1 billion estimate of its total foreign debt, as of March
31, 1994).
70 See South Korea's Meltdown, EcONOMIsT, Dec. 13, 1997, at 33 (noting South Korean finance
ministry's admission that earlier short-term debt estimates of $65 billion were inaccurate and should be
adjusted to over $100 billion).
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the total debt was more than double the originally stated amount, we have a ratio of total
debt to GDP of 32.1%, not 15.3%. Similarly, the ratio of total debt to GDP was 50% in
Thailand, 42% in Malaysia, 60% in Indonesia, and 47% in the Philippines, all of which
are much larger than Mexico's 34%. This was yet another warning signal that problems
might lie ahead.
If one reviews short-term debt as a percentage of GDP, once again we see Korea's
values are more than twice as large as believed. Korea's ratio of short-term debt to GDP
was 10.3% in 1996, as compared with Mexico's value of 9.3% in 1994. Similarly, the
ratio of short-term debt to GDP was 21% in Thailand, almost 12% in Malaysia, almost
15% in Indonesia, and at 9% in the Philippines. The ratio of short-term debt as a
percentage of GDP was much too high. This was another warning signal.
The next value is short-term financing of trade or current account less foreign
investments, divided by GDP. In Korea, it was -5.2%; in Thailand, it was -6.8%; in
Malaysia, it was -4.0%; and in Indonesia, it was -1.4%. Again, we see yet another
warning signal.
The last two indices shown here are less important. All of the Asian countries,
except for Indonesia, were doing well compared to Mexico with respect to debt service as
a percentage of GDP. The number of months of imports that could be financed by these
nations' reserves was much higher than Mexico, which barely had enough reserves in
1994 to finance two months of imports.7' In 1996, Thailand had adequate reserves to
"' See Economists Contend Mexican Peso's Fall Won't Have Costly Effect for Latin America, ORLANDO
SENTINEL, Dec. 26, 1994, at A7 (stating that Mexican reserves dropped from $25 billion to $6.5 billion in
1994, barely enough to cover two months of imports).
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finance five months worth of imports, and the others had similar reserves. 2 This is true
even though Korea, once again, reported their reserves at twice their actual size.
It is important to note that the exchange rate index is not listed here. The
exchange rates in Korea, Thailand, Indonesia, Malaysia, and the Philippines did not
change much in 1996. Nonetheless, the exchange rates have become grossly overvalued,
even though the actual numbers did not seem to indicate the situation. The reason for this
overvaluation was the linkage of these currencies to the dollar. As a result, when the
dollar appreciated approximately 53% with respect to the Yen between the first quarter of
1995 and the first quarter of 1996, the Asian countries were similarly affected.73
In addition, China's 30% currency devaluation at the beginning of 1994 resulted
in an overvaluation of other currencies, even though this was not indicated by actual
figures. 74
Therefore, the current account deficit, total debt, short-term debt, amount of the
current account financed by short-term capital, and the exchange rate were all certainly
warning signals. They all indicated that these countries were about to enter into a crisis.
No one could anticipate or forecast when a crisis might occur, but an economic spark
from any direction could set it off. Nonetheless, with all due respect, there were some
people who had anticipated the crisis.
' See Thailand's Current Account Deficit Surpasses Expectations, AGENCE FRANCE PRESSE, Mar. 5,
1996, available in 1996 WL 3816105 (stating that Thailand had enough foreign reserves to cover
approximately six months of imports in the spring of 1996).
1 See Anthony Rowley, Export Competitiveness Shifting Fast, Bus. TIMES (Sing.), Apr. 18, 1997, at 5
(noting appreciation of the U.S. dollar against the Japanese yen and the consequent increase in the
exchange rate of Asian countries linked to the U.S. dollar).
I See generally Joseph Kahn and Michael Schuman, Depression's Ghost Hovers Over Asia! Deflation,
WALL ST. J., Oct. 31, 1997, at A16 (noting that China's devaluation of the yuan in 1994 and resultant
deflation of neighboring currencies started financial problems in the area).
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When the Soviet Union collapsed, people who had studied the Soviet Union had
not forecasted that the collapse was coming. 5 As a result, many wondered if all of this
studying served a purpose. Of course, after the fact, the same analysts came up with
many different explanations.
The IMF knew that these countries were in trouble,1 6 but it was not free to tell
others. Michael Mussa, of the IMF, asked, "Where were all the fund managers? Were
they asleep? They make millions of dollars in profits, they should have known a crisis
was coming."77 This statement was a clear indicator that there was a predictable crisis in
the making after all.
The three economies that I placed in a separate category earlier, Singapore, Hong
Kong and Taiwan, were affected by the Asian Crisis very differently. When looking at
the per capita income in Singapore, Hong Kong, and Taiwan, South Korea is the only
other country whose income approaches these levels. All of the others are below $5,000
in real per capita income.
Table 2
Macroeconomics and Financial Indicators for Mexico in 1994 and East Asian Emerging
Markets with Weak Fundamentals in 1996 (percentages)
Indicator Singapore Hong Kong Taiwan
7 See Robert Conquest, The End of Global Tick-Tack-Toe, WASH. POST, Apr. 2, 1990, at A ll (explaining
the economists and non-economists' surprise at the collapse of the Soviet government), Jerome R. Watson,
Soviets Present New Enigma, CHI. SUN-TIMES, July 22, 1990, at 8 (noting that the collapse of the Russian
empire left U.S. policymakers and academic experts scrambling).
" See ThaiAuthorities Ignored JMFAdvice, ASIAN WALL ST. J., Aug. 13, 1997, at 3 (noting that the IMF
warned the Bangkok government that the economy was heading for trouble); G7 Moves Closer to Giving
IMF More Teeth, AGENCE FR.-PRESsE, May 17, 1998, available in 1998 WL 2282612 (noting that
Thailand ignored repeated warnings from the IMF prior to the Asian crisis).
' Michael Mussa, IMFSurveillance, Presentation at the American Economic Association in New Orleans
(Jan. 1998).
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1996 1997 1996 1997 1996 1997
GDP/Capita 23,980 25,290 23,640 24,350 12,810 13,550
(intern. $)
S/GDP 50.1 50.0 30.6 30.8 28.0 27.9
BB/GDP 8.4 8.3 2.2 4.2 0.2 0.2
CA/GDP 15.0 14.0 -1.3 -1.5 5.2 4.2
EDT/GDP 11.2 N/A 0.0 0.0 10.1 N/A
RESERVES (billion 75.7 74.4 65.9 80.3 88.6 84.0
Legend:
S = Domestic GDP = Gross BB = Budget Balance
Savings Domestic (deficit (-) and
Product surplus (+))
CA = Current Account EDT = Total External Debt
RES = International Reserves (excluding gold) in billion of
U.S. dollars
Chalmers Johnson," a renowned expert in U.S.-Japanese relations, said that the
United States was in trouble, that Japan would rule the world, and that its per capita
income was already higher than that of the United States.79 This, however, is not entirely
accurate. If income is converted from yen to U.S. dollars, Japanese per capita income is
$36,000 per year, as compared to $24,000 or $25,000 in the United States. Nonetheless,
Japan's cost of living, as we know, is much higher than our own." Thus, simply using
the exchange rate makes little sense. If we adjust the income per capita for the much
11 President and Director, Japan Policy Research Institute.
79 See generally CHALMERS JOHNSON, JAPAN: WHO GOVERNS? THE RISE OF THE DEVELOPMENTAL STATE
(1995).
11 See generally Tony Boyd, The Financial Woes of Japan Are Landlocked, AUSTRL. FIN. REv., Sept. 28,
1998, at 7 (stating that although Japan has the highest per capita income among industrial countries, high
real estate and food costs reduce Japanese purchasing power by 20 to 30 percent); see also Brian J. Barna,
An Economic Roadmap to Korean Reunification: Pitfall and Prospects, AsIAN SURVEY, Mar. 1, 1998, at
265 (comparing currency conversion methods using "traded-goods" exchange values with those using
"purchasing power parity").
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higher cost of living in Japan, we find that the actual per capita income in Japan is
$21,000 to $22,000, as opposed to $25,000 in the United States.
Nonetheless, Hong Kong, Singapore and Taiwan were not in trouble. The figures
reveal that all of these countries maintained unbelievable savings rates. Furthermore,
except for Taiwan, each of the countries maintained large budget surpluses. With the
exception of Hong Kong, the ratio of the percentage of the capital account to GDP for all
these countries was positive. The ratio of total debt to GDP in these countries was also
much lower than in Mexico or other countries, and each country held billions of dollars in
reserves. These countries are all in a different league. While the market's test of the
Hong Kong dollar affected them,"l the above figures indicate that they did not collapse.
In summation, a crisis in East Asia should have been anticipated. If it had been,
the problem would not have escalated as it did.
Problems within the Asian countries intensified when those countries
borrowed excessively in dollars and entered into business endeavors outside of their main
Table 3
Growth of Real GDP
Av. 1990- Forecast
Region/Country 4 1995 1996 1997 1998
Advanced Economies 2.0 2.5 2.7 3.0 2.5
Asia 8.1 8.9 8.1 6.8 5.7
Hong Kong 5.3 4.5 4.9 5.3 5.0
Singapore 8.7 8.8 7.0 6.0 5.5
" See Peter C. DuBois, Hong Kong Bites the Bullet and Defends Its Currency with Higher Rates, But For
How Long?, BARRON'S, Oct. 27, 1997, at MW8 (noting analysts' concern with the Asian crisis' effect on
the Hong Kong dollar).
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Taiwan 6.5 6.0 5.7 6.2 6.0
Korea 7.6 8.9 7.1 6.0 -5.0
Thailand 9.1 8.7 6.4 0.6 -3.5
Malaysia 8.7 9.5 8.6 7.0 2.5
Indonesia 8.0 8.2 8.0 5.0 -5.0
Philippines 1.8 4.8 5.7 4.3 3.0
India 4.7 7.4 6.9 5.8 5.0
China 10.7 10.5 9.6 8.2 7.2
Western Hemisphere 3.3 1.2 3.5 5.2 3.5
Transition Economies -7.3 -1.3 -0.1 1.9 3.4
Africa 1.7 2.9 5.3 3.4 4.7
businesses.8 2 As a result, they experienced phenomenal growth at rates of 7%. 8%, and
10% per year 83 as opposed to our growth rate of 2% or 2.5% per year. Local businesses
also borrowed heavily, overestimating their abilities. Their borrowing costs were
approximately 9% to 10% per year despite paying higher rates in local currency, when
adjusted for inflation. As a result of this heavy borrowing in dollars, Asian currencies
became overvalued. When the markets realized that a problem existed, a panic began,
capital inflows stopped, exchange rates plummeted, and the debt could not be repaid.
This was not a panic based on rumors or ignorance of the real world; the panic started due
81 See Russian Economic Crisis: Hearing Before the House Banking Oversight Comm., 105' Cong. (Sept.
10, 1998) (transcript available at 1998 WL 778981) (testimony of Mark Weisbrot, Research Director,
Preamble Center on the IMF and its Operations in Russia, discussing the opinions of Jagdish Bhagwhati,
former Director General of the GATr (1991-1993), and Jeffrey Sachs and Steve Radelet, Harvard Institute
of International Development, that excessive borrowing by Asian banks and firms was an integral cause of
the Asian crisis).
3 See IMF Proposal to Stem Asian Financial Crisis: Statement of Alan Greenspan, Chairman of the
Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, CONG. TESTIMONY BY FED. DOCUMENT CLEARING
HousE, May 21, 1998, available in 1998 WL 11518445 (quoting Chairman Greenspan's testimony that
East Asia maintained real growth rates of close to 10% per year for an extended period of time); see also
Where to Invest in 1998: Strategies for Stocks: Asia, BUS. WK., Dec. 29, 1997, at 112 (stating that East
Asia had approximately 8% to 10% growth over the 15 years prior to the crisis).
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to capital over-borrowing. Corruption, nepotism, and crony capitalism added to this
effectY
Each government, Japan and Korea in particular, must be frank in addressing
these issues. They must not contribute to the problem by obfuscating them. Facing the
problems directly and openly is the only way these economies will grow strong again.
DISCUSSION:
MALCOM BINKS:
As we have many traders in the room today, let us engage in speculative fiction.
We have had, in recent weeks and months, people as distinguished as Jim Wolfenson,
President of the World Bank; Alan Greenspan, in testimony to Congress and others
noting the inevitability of such financial crises. In a Washington Post article, Wolfenson
stated that, "it's inevitable that within the next five years we are going to have a crisis of
similar magnitude." This is the nature of the international financial system now. With
information flowing rapidly and large sums of capital coursing through the veins of
international commerce, our ability to control devaluation or stem panic is not really there
yet. Simply put, we do not have the architecture Treasury Secretary Rubin recommends.
As for the future, we must attempt to foresee where the next crisis will arise.
Consider Russia. Our Russian analysts hypothesize that, given the political instability
See David Smith, The Asian Tigers Turn Tail, SUNDAY TIMES- LONDON, May 24. 1998, at 10
(discussing the crisis's secondary effect of exposing crony capitalism in East Asian governments and
businesses); Skip Kaltenheuser, Go as You Pay: An International Attack on the Business of Briber'.
BARRON'S, Sept. 28, 1998, at 59 (noting that South Korea's citizens blame corrupt bureaucrats for bringing
about the crisis); Helen Hughes, IMF Is Right On Indonesia, AUsTL. FIN. REV.. Mar. 12, 1998, at 18
(noting widespread nepotism and corruption in Indonesia, South Korea, and Thailand, the most affected
countries in the crisis).
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there, the Russian economy is on the brink of implosion, and it could happen at any time.
Consider also Brazil; their current account deficit is creeping up close to five percent
now. Finally, we have continuing concerns about Japan and their sustained period of
deflation and what that could do to the regional economy.
There is also talk about the "bubble" here in the United States, which could pop
and change investor expectations. It could be something like the "millennium bug" or the
Y2K problem. In the Wall Street Journal an author predicted a 66% chance of global
recession in the latter half of 1999 due to the Y2K problem. These are all crucial points
to consider.
DR. DOMINICK SALVATORE:
The IMF has been accused of many things, and to some extent it is deserved. The
world financial markets' huge financial flows, however, can move at the spur of the
moment, based on rumors and many other reasons. As a result, it is inevitable that we
run the risk of a crisis in the future as long as there are liberalized capital markets.
My opinion on how to avoid these problems is to let the markets operate freely. If
all the information were required to have been made available, the markets would have
realized that problems were in the making, and would have reacted much earlier. The
problem may not. have been avoided, but it would have been much less extensive than it
is now.
In short, the IMF should stimulate nations to release essential economic
information. For instance, if Mexico had not hidden information, and other nations knew
how serious their situation was, the crisis may have come earlier and been of a smaller
magnitude. The same is true for Asia. Even if the IMF cannot force countries to release
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information, it can and should encourage them to do so. Markets would then assume that
a nation's failure to provide timely and adequate information as an indication that the
nation is hiding something. While we may not be able to avoid future crises, we can
provide the markets with information, which will allow them to respond to crises in a
timely manner. This may be the only measure that minimizes the number and seriousness
of future crises.
BRADLEY BELT:
Malcolm Binks, I know that individual countries can decide whether or not to
release IMF reviews of their economies. Some countries that release IMF reviews are
Argentina, Chile, Hong Kong, Germany, Japan, the United States, and India. Countries
that do not release reviews are Brazil, Malaysia, Mexico, Indonesia, Thailand, China, and
Russia. If investors do not receive IMF critiques will they refrain from investing in these
countries?
MALCOLM BINKS:
Perhaps they should, but I do not think it is something that investors look at every
day. There is another element in all of this, one item in particular is the confidence
factor. It is an elusive, intangible thing. There were a lot of signals for the Asian
economies as to the nature of their problems. Korea avoided telling the world about their
problems, even if they had not concealed them. Conversely, Thailand revealed their
numbers for the world to see. Everyone knew about the boom in the real estate market in
Bangkok and everyone knew about the state of disarray of account. Yet, business in
Bangkok continued because people had confidence. They incorrectly assumed, problems
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notwithstanding, that other factors existed in the market at the time to allow the public to
remain confident.
It is very hard to predict which country will experience a crisis because of the
elusive element of confidence. It behooves everyone to look more closely at the
numbers.
What is needed is a better IMF credit agency monitoring system to provide early
warning. The coda to this, however, is to heed the warning signs; to ignore the signs will
tempt fate a second time. Therefore, more thought should be directed towards the
response mechanism, be it the IMF or a new agency. A response mechanism may
provide a prompt response when these countries run into a crisis.
The Asian Crisis began in Thailand, spread to Malaysia, and then spread over
Asia. The loss of confidence in these countries resulted in severe remedies. Less affected
countries were adversely affected regardless.
Tough years are ahead for nations such as Thailand and Korea. There must be a
better way to head off these crises and to deal with the contagion effect. While analysis is
good, transparency and improved regulation is needed. Additionally, most of these
countries are still developing and must contend with growing pains.
QUESTION #1:
The tables present a snapshot of the crisis, one-year.- If you follow the data, how
long did it take Mexico or other countries to end up in crisis? Do you have any data on
that? How long can they sustain those ratios before a crisis takes place?
DR. DOMINICK SALVATORE:
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In Mexico, the crisis developed in 1993 and 1994. In Asia, the 1996 data
presented became available in the spring of 1997, after the crisis in Thailand arose. At
that point it was too late. The 1995 data for Mexico was available in the spring of 1996,
before the problems began.
The IMF has to prevent a localized financial crisis from becoming a real and
extensive economic crisis. The IMF had no choice but to help these countries out after
the crisis began. Aiding these countries, however, creates a moral hazard problem. A
forty to fifty percent increase in earnings is considered a private return; any decrease in
earnings becomes a public loss. Thus, more transparency would prevent some crises and
make those that occur weaker. If a third of the banking and business sectors that
conducted irresponsible transactions went out of business, as they should, markets would
not have to suffer. If large and devastating losses were born by those who make serious
mistakes, then the problem of moral hazard will diminish significantly.
QUESTION #2:
Dr. Salvatore, did you do a schedule on the United States, and are there any
warning signs for us? Do you have an extended one that we might be able to see?
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DR. DOMINICK SALVATORE:
No. In the United States we say we are in a "bubble economy", which is a
completely different economy than those being discussed. It is difficult to compare Asia
to Mexico, but to compare the United States to Mexico is not feasible. One could not use
these indicators to draw an inference from what happened in Asia or Mexico to the
United States.
